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A GIRL’S RIGHT TO BARE ARMS: AN 
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF 
PUBLIC-SCHOOL DRESS CODES 
Abstract: Public schools throughout the country have faced heavy criticism for 
instituting dress codes that many perceive to be targeting girls and imposing 
overly restrictive requirements on their attire. Critics of public-school dress codes 
often take particular issue with the notion that restrictive dress codes are neces-
sary to prevent classroom distractions. Because public schools are state actors, 
they must comply with constitutional requirements. Thus, when schools impose 
different rules on the basis of gender, those rules must comply with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This clause mandates that the gov-
ernment offer an exceedingly persuasive justification for any sex-based classifi-
cation. Moreover, the justification offered by the school must be genuine and 
may not rely on nor perpetuate gender-based stereotypes. Courts have generally 
accepted schools’ arguments that their dress codes served the interests of student 
health and safety, preventing classroom distraction, and instilling morals and dis-
cipline. This Note evaluates the application of the Equal Protection Clause to 
public-school dress codes, explores the various school justifications that have 
been deemed acceptable, and argues that, under the standard set forth in Equal 
Protection jurisprudence, a school’s desire to prevent classroom distraction may 
no longer be an acceptable defense absent authentic evidence of its necessity. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, Lizzy Martinez, a seventeen-year-old Florida public high school 
student, received a painful sunburn on her chest over the weekend and found 
that wearing a bra exacerbated her pain.1 The following Monday, she decided 
not to wear a bra to school, instead opting to wear a dark oversized shirt that 
would not attract any attention to her chest.2 After a few hours at school, she 
was called out of her class and sent to meet with the principal and dean of the 
school.3 They told her that, despite her painful sunburn, her decision not to 
wear a bra was a violation of the school’s dress code.4 Though none of Lizzy’s 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Hayley Krischer, Is Your Body Appropriate to Wear to School?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/style/student-bra-nipples-school.html [https://perma.cc/MC5N-
2TTX]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. Though the dress code did not explicitly require female students to wear bras, the school 
nevertheless maintained that it was a violation of the code. Id.; see SCH. DIST. OF MANATEE CTY., 
CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT: 2017-2018, at 28–30 (2017), https://www.manateeschools.net/cms/lib/
FL02202357/Centricity/domain/1115/documents/2017-2018_Student_Code_of_Conduct.pdf [https://
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classmates had commented on her outfit, the dean told her that boys had been 
staring and laughing.5 
In a similar 2016 incident, an eleven-year-old Maryland girl was forced to 
miss twenty minutes of class because she wore leggings to school, which was a 
violation of the public school’s dress code.6 Her mother confronted school of-
ficials after having to bring her daughter a pair of jeans.7 The officials told her 
that it serves as a classroom distraction when girls wear leggings and the ends 
of their shirts fail to reach the length of their fingertips.8 They claimed that 
similar rules were imposed on male students and that they were meant to pre-
pare students for college and their careers.9 The girl’s mother disagreed, char-
acterized the policy as discriminatory, and told a reporter that she planned to 
take legal action.10 
Public-school dress codes have recently received a great deal of attention, 
with many people arguing that they target, either explicitly or implicitly, fe-
male students.11 As more and more dress codes face such accusations, students 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/2SP6-CA5Y] (setting forth the school’s dress code policy). The dress code details the spe-
cific types of clothing that both males and females are allowed to wear and lists a general prohibition 
of certain types of clothes for any student. SCH. DIST. OF MANATEE CTY., supra, at 28–30. There is no 
mention of bras, but the most applicable provisions state that for both genders, “all undergarments 
must be covered” and “any clothing . . . that may be a distraction to self or others” is forbidden. See id. 
 5 Krischer, supra note 1. 
 6 Donna St. George, Are Leggings Too Distracting? A Mom Takes on a ‘Sexist’ School Dress 
Code, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/are-leggings-
too-distracting-a-mom-takes-on-sexist-school-dress-code/2016/11/05/2c677b00-960e-11e6-bc79-
af1cd3d2984b_story.html [https://perma.cc/UYT2-WCCE]. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See Laura Bates, How School Dress Codes Shame Girls and Perpetuate Rape Culture, TIME 
(May 22, 2015), https://time.com/3892965/everydaysexism-school-dress-codes-rape-culture [https://
perma.cc/DA7P-ZPU7] (arguing that dress codes imply that “[g]irls’ bodies are dangerous and har-
assment is inevitable”); Soraya Chemaly, What School Dress Codes Have to Do with Harvey Wein-
stein, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parenting/wp/2017/10/20/
what-school-dress-codes-have-to-do-with-harvey-weinstein [https://perma.cc/3XSZ-7HSW] (arguing 
that school dress codes are often directed at girls and objectify them in a way that contributes to a 
culture of sexual harassment); Peggy Orenstein, The Battle Over Dress Codes, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/opinion/the-battle-over-dress-codes.html [https://perma.
cc/47BJ-U5YA] (expressing concern that school dress codes are targeting and sexualizing girls); see, 
e.g., Kristin Finan, Austin Schools’ Dress Codes ‘Sexist, Racist’ Group Says, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN 
(Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.statesman.com/news/20181008/austin-schools-dress-codes-sexist-racist-
group-says [https://perma.cc/5CJV-YC58] (describing a Texas school district in which a majority of 
the students suspended for dress code violations were female); Sonja Haller, Texas Principal Apolo-
gizes for Sexist ‘Bad Girls’ Dress Code Video After It Goes Viral, USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/allthemoms/2018/08/20/questionable-school-dress-code-video-
goes-viral-principal-apologizes/1043770002/ [https://perma.cc/D2E6-DGWQ] (describing the criti-
cism another Texas school faced for displaying a video with the following features: only female stu-
dents violating the dress code, the students being required to repeatedly chant a promise not to wear 
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throughout the country are standing up to challenge their school’s dress poli-
cies.12 Some have chosen to do so by participating in silent protests on cam-
pus, creating online petitions, or confronting their school boards directly.13 
Others have brought lawsuits against their schools, some of which claim that 
the dress codes violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.14 
The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government provide an ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification when it makes classifications on the basis of 
sex.15 Thus, when a public school imposes a dress code that targets female stu-
dents, it will be required to prove that it is substantially related to the school’s 
legitimate interest.16 This Note explores the validity of these schools’ justifica-
tions under the Equal Protection Clause when their dress codes have been said 
to discriminate against female students.17 
Part I of this Note discusses the application of the Equal Protection 
Clause to gender discrimination and then examines the legal precedent that has 
                                                                                                                           
athletic shorts, a song called “Bad Girls” playing in the background, and the camera zooming in on the 
girls’ legs giving some the impression of sexualization); Andrew Marra, PBC Mayor Blasts Forest 
Hill High For ‘Sexism’ Over Daughter’s Torn Jeans, PALM BEACH POST (Sept. 13, 2018), https://
www.palmbeachpost.com/news/local-education/pbc-mayor-blasts-forest-hill-high-for-sexism-over-
daughter-torn-jeans/aIJjinXAwp5Xd0LDsDUFfO/ [https://perma.cc/MC76-8NJM] (telling the story 
of a Floridian girl who was removed from class during a quiz and told to think about how her ripped 
jeans, which violated the dress code, impacted the boys in her class and affected their hormones); Gail 
Sullivan, New Kid at School Forced to Wear ‘Shame Suit’ for Dress Code Violation, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/05/new-kid-at-
school-forced-to-wear-shame-suit-for-dress-code-violation [https://perma.cc/4VCR-FR3N] (describ-
ing a girl whose skirt was one inch too short and who was consequently forced to wear a humiliating 
neon shirt that read “dress code violation”). 
 12 See Krischer, supra note 1 (describing various student challenges to public-school dress codes). 
 13 See id. (describing the silent protest at Lizzy Martinez’s school in which many female students 
showed up to school without bras, some of whom also put X-shaped bandages on their backpacks); Vic-
toria Schantz, We Took on Our School’s Sexist Dress Code, and We Won, ACLU (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/student-speech-and-privacy/we-took-our-schools-sexist-dress-
code-and-we-won [https://perma.cc/T47Y-PSFP] (describing students’ successful efforts to change their 
school’s dress code by confronting the school board with an online petition that had three thousand signa-
tures and first-hand stories of when the policy made them feel objectified and degraded). Other forms of 
protest throughout the country included the popular Twitter hashtag, “#iammorethanadistraction.” 
Krischer, supra note 1. 
 14 See Brunswick Co. Students Challenge Public Charter School’s Policy Requiring Girls to Wear 
Skirts, ACLU N.C. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/en/press-releases/brunswick-
co-students-challenge-public-charter-schools-policy-requiring-girls-wear [https://perma.cc/8BDY-
PAV3] [hereinafter Brunswick] (describing a lawsuit against a school that required female students to 
wear skirts); see, e.g., Peltier v. Charter Day Sch., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 579, 595–97 (E.D.N.C. 2017) 
(discussing an Equal Protection challenge to a North Carolina school’s dress code). 
 15 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (setting the legal standard for evaluat-
ing classifications on the basis of sex under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 16 See id. (requiring a substantial relationship between the sex classification and the government 
interest that it is purported to serve); Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 577–78 
(7th Cir. 2014) (describing the history of and standard for evaluating dress codes under the Equal 
Protection Clause within the context of gender discrimination). 
 17 See infra notes 21–212 and accompanying text. 
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been set in the context of public-school dress codes.18 Part II extracts a legal 
standard under which to evaluate dress codes in light of the relevant case law.19 
Lastly, Part III reexamines the standards set forth in dress code litigation in a 
more modern light and argues that schools may no longer be able to justify 
their dress codes by arguing that they prevent distraction.20 
I. CHALLENGES TO DRESS CODES: WEAVING TOGETHER  
THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Although some students have chosen to challenge their schools’ dress 
codes through measures such as protests and attendance at schoolboard meet-
ings, others have sought change in court.21 One approach has been to file a 
complaint against the school district alleging a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the U.S. Constitution.22 This Part provides an overview of the 
relevant case law that serves as a guideline in evaluating dress codes that al-
legedly target female students under the Equal Protection Clause.23 Section A 
details the Supreme Court’s approach to gender discrimination within the con-
text of Equal Protection.24 Section B examines cases addressing allegedly sex-
discriminatory dress codes and the various approaches courts have taken.25 
A. Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
states from denying citizens equal protection of the laws.26 Thus, when the 
government creates a classification that treats certain classes of people differ-
ently, and the classification bears no relation to the purpose of the government 
action, it will be deemed unconstitutional.27 Enacted in the nineteenth century, 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 21–128 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 129–175 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 176–212 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Brunswick, supra note 14 (describing lawsuit filed by the Peltier family, amongst others, 
challenging a school’s policy requiring that female students wear skirts instead of pants under the 
Equal Protection Clause); Krischer, supra note 1 (describing protests against dress codes); Schantz, 
supra note 13 (telling story of students convincing their school board to change their dress code); see 
also Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 595–97 (addressing Peltier’s Equal Protection claims). 
 22 Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 595–97; see Brunswick, supra note 14 (noting that the lawsuit was 
brought under both the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX). 
 23 See infra notes 26–128 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 26–57 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 58–128 and accompanying text. 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 27 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1971) (noting the general authority of the states to treat 
groups differently when the classification relates to the objective of the government action); Ryan 
James & Jane Zara, Equal Protection, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2 (2002) (noting that the government 
is not prohibited from discriminating under the Equal Protection Clause unless the discrimination is 
“invidious”). Courts evaluate certain distinctions, characterized as suspect classifications, with greater 
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the Equal Protection Clause was first used to invalidate a sex-based classifica-
tion in the 1970s.28 
The current standard for evaluating government classifications on the ba-
sis of sex was developed in the 1996 U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. 
Virginia.29 Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was a male-only university that 
employed a unique and rigorous method of training in order to prepare men to 
excel as “citizen-soldiers.”30 VMI’s male-only admissions policy was chal-
lenged in 1990 after a female student, who wanted to attend VMI, filed a com-
plaint with the Attorney General.31 Pursuant to an order from the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, Virginia sought to remedy the Equal Protection violation 
by establishing a parallel program for women.32 The program shared the same 
                                                                                                                           
scrutiny. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (noting the traditional classifications 
that have been deemed “inherently suspect” and adding classifications on the basis of sex to the list, 
thereby subjecting it to heightened scrutiny). There are three levels of scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and classifications are more likely to be found unconstitutional under the higher levels of 
scrutiny. James & Zara, supra, at 4–5. The highest level, called strict scrutiny, applies to race and 
national origin and requires a “compelling government interest” that is “narrowly tailored.” See id. at 
5–6 (discussing the factors and characteristics that warrant a classification being deemed suspect and 
thus receiving strict scrutiny). Classifications such as sex and legitimacy are considered quasi-suspect 
and receive heightened scrutiny, which requires that the classifications be “substantially related” to 
“an important governmental objective” in order to survive. Id. at 8–9. Lastly, classifications that are 
neither suspect nor quasi-suspect are subject to the much more deferential rational basis review, which 
only requires a “rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.” Id. at 9–10. 
 28 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532 (discussing the history of sex-based classifications under the 
Equal Protection Clause). See generally Reed, 404 U.S. at 74–75, 77 (ruling that classification on the 
basis of sex is an issue under the Equal Protection Clause and invalidating an Idaho law favoring 
males as the administer of an estate because the law bore no “rational relationship” to the purpose of 
the law); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58, 68–69 (1961) (upholding under the Equal Protection 
Clause a Florida law that generally exempted women from serving on juries). Sex-based classifica-
tions were subject to inconsistent levels of scrutiny for a significant period of time. See Craig v. Bor-
en, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a sex-based classification); Frontiero, 
411 U.S. at 688 (applying strict scrutiny to a sex-based classification); Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (applying 
rational basis review to a sex-based classification); James & Zara, supra note 27, at 14–18 (discussing 
the levels of scrutiny applied to sex-based classifications). Since 1996, heightened scrutiny has re-
mained the proper level. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (describing the level of scrutiny as one that 
requires an “exceedingly persuasive” justification). Moreover, some have actually interpreted it to be 
somewhat in between heightened and strict scrutiny. See James & Zara, supra note 27, at 26–29 (dis-
cussing the legacy and interpretations of Virginia). 
 29 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33; see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 
(2003) (describing the standard set forth in Virginia and characterizing it as a heightened scrutiny 
because it is a more difficult standard to meet than rational-basis review). 
 30 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520–22. VMI’s mission to produce “citizen-soldiers” was one that sought 
to prepare students to be future civilians and members of the military. Id. In order to achieve this ob-
jective, the educational model pushed students to learn how to thrive under significant amounts of 
stress and rigorous physical training. Id. 
 31 Id. at 523. 
 32 Id. at 526. Initially, the District Court found that VMI’s exclusion of women was justified un-
der the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence. Id. at 523–24. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found an Equal Protection violation, remanded the case, and instructed Virginia to 
2552 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2547 
mission as VMI but lacked the same educational and financial resources.33 It 
also employed educational methods that were starkly different from VMI’s 
unique training.34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to address 
whether VMI’s male-only policy violated the Equal Protection Clause and, if 
so, whether the parallel program was a sufficient remedy.35 
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg reiterated that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause places a burden on the government to prove the existence of an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for a sex-based classification.36 Specifi-
cally, the government is required to show that an important objective is served 
by the classification and that the discriminatory classification is substantially 
related to that objective.37 The justification may not be based on, nor perpetu-
ate, stereotypes about the capabilities or inclinations of men and women.38 
Moreover, although there are natural differences between males and females 
that do not have to be ignored, these distinctions must not be used to legally, 
socially, or economically subordinate women.39 
Virginia argued that VMI’s exclusion of women was justified because it 
yielded significant educational benefits by allowing for more diverse educa-
tional methods.40 It also defended the single-sex policy by arguing that the 
unique method of training would be unsuitable for women and that admitting 
women would force the school to make dramatic and detrimental changes to 
their program.41 The Court, however, was unwilling to automatically accept a 
justification without actual evidence.42 It rejected the educational diversity jus-
                                                                                                                           
either admit women, create a parallel school for women, or stop accepting government funding for 
VMI. Id. at 524–26. 
 33 Id. at 526. 
 34 See id. at 526–27 (noting that, unlike the adversative methods used at VMI, the women’s pro-
gram was cooperative and designed to raise participants’ self-esteem). 
 35 Id. at 530–31. 
 36 See id. at 533–34 (summarizing and expanding on Equal Protection jurisprudence in the con-
text of sex discrimination). 
 37 Id. at 533. 
 38 See id. at 533–34 (requiring that the justification be “genuine, not hypothesized” and prohibit-
ing it from being based on gendered stereotypes); see, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 729–30 (1982) (finding a nursing school’s admission policy’s exclusion of males to violate 
the Equal Protection Clause and describing it as one that “perpetuate[s] the stereotype” that nursing is 
a career meant only for women and turns it into a “self-fulfilling prophecy”). 
 39 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533–34 (noting that biological differences between men and women 
are to be celebrated but not used to subjugate women in any capacity). 
 40 Id. at 535. The Court, in response to this argument, acknowledged that single-sex education can 
be a beneficial form of education in some circumstances, but found that this was not the genuine pur-
pose of excluding women. Id. 
 41 Id. at 540. Similarly, in defense of their parallel women’s program, Virginia argued that it was 
sufficiently remedial because the differences between the two programs were justified by the differ-
ences between the psychological, physical, and educational needs of men and women. Id. at 549. 
 42 See id. at 535–36 (requiring that the justification be an actual description of the government’s 
purposes). 
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tification, as Virginia failed to offer any other proof that this was a genuine 
purpose in their admissions policy.43 Moreover, in response to the argument 
that VMI’s training would be unsuitable for women and that their admission 
would harm the program, the Court acknowledged that some aspects of the 
program would need to be changed in order to acclimate women.44 The Court 
also noted that this is not necessarily true of all women and that the state could 
therefore not rely on such a broad, and potentially self-fulfilling, stereotype to 
deny all women this opportunity.45 Because the exclusion of women did not 
significantly help VMI achieve its ultimate mission of producing citizen-
soldiers, the court found that Virginia failed to demonstrate an acceptable justi-
fication.46 
A governmental sex-based classification will be constitutional only when 
the justification is exceedingly persuasive and substantially connected to the 
accomplishment of the government’s objective.47 Classifications that are based 
on real biological differences between males and females, such as pregnancy 
and childbirth, are more likely to withstand heightened scrutiny.48 On the other 
hand, courts are unlikely to find a sufficient link between the means and the 
ends when the distinction is grounded in stereotypes.49 Moreover, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See id. at 536–40 (noting VMI’s historical exclusion of women). 
 44 See id. at 540 (noting the main aspects of the program that would need changing to be “housing 
assignments and physical training programs”). The Court referred to a significant amount of testimony 
that supported the notion that many women would be unable to handle the rigorous training methods 
employed, but that some women would be more than capable of doing so. Id. at 540–41. The court 
characterized this evidence as describing “tendencies” of women and pointed to previous decisions 
that cautioned courts from accepting overly broad tendencies as justifications for sex-based classifica-
tions. Id. at 541; see, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994) (noting that empirical 
data that provides some support for a gendered stereotype will not cure an Equal Protection violation); 
Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724–25 (prohibiting classifications from relying on “fixed no-
tions” about men and women). 
 45 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541–45 (noting that although many women would be averse to VMI’s 
methodology, it was likely that many men would feel the same way). Additionally, the Court found 
that Virginia’s defense of its parallel program, which was based on the different needs of men and 
women, also relied too much on overly broad stereotypes. Id. at 549–50 (noting that some women 
would thrive under VMI’s educational model). 
 46 Id. at 546. 
 47 Id. at 533; see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001) (discussing the requirement that there be 
a “fit between the means and . . . ends”). 
 48 See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63–64 (upholding a law because it was based on real biological 
differences). In Nguyen, the Court reviewed a law setting forth the requirements of attaining citizen-
ship for a child born oversees to unmarried parents when one of the child’s parents is a United States 
citizen, but the other is not. Id. at 59. The law imposed additional requirements to prove parenthood 
when the child’s father was the United States citizen rather than the mother. Id. at 60. The Court up-
held the law, pointing to the legitimate government interest in assuring a meaningful relationship 
between the parent and child. Id. at 70. The Court also reasoned that the realities of pregnancy and 
childbirth assure that the mother will have the opportunity to develop a meaningful relationship with 
her child more so than the father would be able to. Id. at 65. 
 49 See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692–94 (2017) (invalidating a statutory 
provision that relied on overbroad generalizations regarding female nurturance and domesticity, which 
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Court has indicated in dicta that Equal Protection decisions can be affected by 
new or evolving societal points of view and that things which were once ac-
ceptable may now be deemed unequal.50 
A sex-based classification need not be explicit in order to trigger constitu-
tional scrutiny.51 Rather, a facially neutral law, one that is universally applica-
ble to both genders, can still violate the Equal Protection Clause when it has a 
                                                                                                                           
the court noted are harmful stereotypes that create self-fulling prophecies regardless of how accurate 
they may be); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 538 U.S. at 736 (noting that stereotypes about women’s 
domestic roles are paralleled by stereotypes about men not having to fulfill those roles and create a 
“self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination”); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 549–50 (declining to accept a justifica-
tion based on women’s supposed preferences or capacities regarding physical and educational train-
ing). 
 50 See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (“[T]he classification must substantially serve an 
important governmental interest today, for ‘in interpreting the [e]qual [p]rotection [guarantee], [we 
have] recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality . . . 
that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.’” (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 
(2015))); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (noting that new recognitions of what constitutes inequality 
can inform Equal Protection analyses); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) 
(“[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era. In determin-
ing what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions 
of equality . . . . Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for the purposes of the Equal Protection 
Clause do change.”) (discussing a poll tax creating a distinction on the basis of wealth). The Harper 
Court supported this notion by pointing to the Supreme Court’s approach to racial segregation, in 
which the Court overturned a prior decision finding segregation to be constitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 383 U.S. at 669–70 (first citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 
(1954), then citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); see Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 (“In ap-
proaching this problem, we cannot turn back the clock to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or 
even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”). Several lower courts have applied this notion as 
a background consideration in various Equal Protection analyses. See, e.g., Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. 
Johns Cty, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1313, 1320 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (importing the concept of “new in-
sights and societal understandings . . . reveal[ing] unjustified inequality” in its iteration of the Equal 
Protection analysis and ultimately finding that a public school’s prohibition of a transgender student 
from the boys’ restroom violated Equal Protection (quoting Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690)); 
F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1144–45 (D. Idaho 2018) (finding that transgender status quali-
fies as a suspect identification (citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603)); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. 
Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 313–14, 333 (D. Conn. 2012) (discussing Harper and the notion of elas-
ticity in concluding that sexual orientation is likely a suspect classification under the Equal Protection 
Clause (citing Harper, 383 U.S. at 669)). For example, in a recent decision finding the male-only 
registration requirement for the draft to be an Equal Protection violation, one court noted that a past 
Supreme Court decision upholding this requirement was no longer controlling due to a significant 
increase in women’s participation in the military. Nat’l Coal. for Men v. Selective Serv. Sys., 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28851, at *13–14 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2019). The court noted in the beginning of the 
Equal Protection analysis that government interests that have been deemed acceptable in the past may 
no longer support a gender-based classification today. Id. at *14 (citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 
2603). Thus, although this classification was justified in the past, it now reflects outdated stereotypes 
about the preferences and capabilities of men and women. See id. at *19–20, *25–26 (concluding that 
the policy’s proponents were unable to demonstrate that the policy continued to be sufficiently related 
to the government’s goal of raising and supporting the army). 
 51 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979) (addressing an Equal Protection 
sex-discrimination challenge to a state statute that gave hiring priority to veterans for civil service 
jobs). 
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disproportionately harmful impact on one gender in a way that reflects sex dis-
crimination.52 In the 1979 case, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney, the U.S. Supreme Court prescribed a two-step inquiry into gender neu-
tral laws.53 The first step is to determine whether the law is genuinely gender-
neutral, rather than implicitly based on gender.54 The next step is to ascertain 
whether the disparate impact was intentional in that the impact on one gender 
influenced the enactment of the policy.55 In order to prevail on an Equal Pro-
tection challenge to a gender-neutral law, it is insufficient to prove that dispro-
portionate impact on one gender is merely incidental.56 In addition, classifica-
tions, either explicit or neutral, do not have to disadvantage or target women in 
order to be problematic; the same level of scrutiny applies when the policy 
discriminates against males and favors females.57 
B. Dress Code Litigation 
The Supreme Court has expressed concern about judicial interference in 
education that intrudes on the role of state and school officials.58 The Court has 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See id. at 274 (setting forth the constitutional framework for analyzing sex discrimination chal-
lenges to gender-neutral laws). In Feeney, the Court evaluated a challenge to a Massachusetts civil 
service statute that gave hiring preference to veterans on the grounds that it disproportionately favored 
males. Id. at 259. Applying the two-step analysis, the Court found that the statute was facially neutral 
because a veteran may be male or female, and that the mere awareness of the potential disproportion-
ate impact, with no other proof of a preference for males, did not amount to a discriminatory purpose. 
Id. at 274–75, 279. 
 53 Id. at 274. 
 54 See id. at 275 (explaining that one method of employing this analysis is to inquire whether the 
law could be “plausibly explained on a neutral ground” and that if it cannot, a classification has likely 
been made). The Court found that the veteran hiring preference could only be rationally explained on 
a gender-neutral ground, and thus, it was a gender-neutral law. Id. 
 55 See id. at 276–79 (elaborating that the governmental choice must be made “because of, not 
merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”) (internal quotations omitted). The 
Court found that there was no purposeful discrimination here because there was no evidence that the 
legislature’s decision was based on anything other than giving a hiring preference to veterans. Id. 
 56 See id. at 275 (finding that the disproportionate impact on women did not reflect gender dis-
crimination); see, e.g., Zalewska v. Cty of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 323 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding a 
government program’s uniform policy requiring van drivers to wear pants rather than skirts because 
the policy was gender neutral and only incidentally impacted female employees). 
 57 See Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 723 (observing how a nursing school’s admission poli-
cy discriminating against males does not protect the policy from Equal Protection challenges nor af-
fect the level of scrutiny applied); see, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (evaluating a statute imposing a 
higher age requirement on males seeking to purchase alcohol than on females). 
 58 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (noting that the Court has 
consistently expressed the view that parents and local officials, rather than federal judges, have the 
duty of educating children); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (noting that state and 
local governments have authority with regards to the operation of schools and advising so that, as a 
result, particular caution must be exercised when courts get involved); Meredith Johnson Harbach, 
Sexualization, Sex Discrimination, and Public School Dress Codes, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1053 
(2016) (noting that the Supreme Court has given greater deference to school administrations than in 
other circumstances). 
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given significant consideration to the fact that schools have the expertise in 
and vital responsibility of caring for and educating the nation’s youth, prepar-
ing them for professional life, and teaching them important cultural values.59 
On numerous occasions, the Court has also noted that public schools play an 
important role in the nation’s democracy by preparing students to be citizens 
and instilling values that are necessary for a successful democratic political 
system.60 In order to allow schools to fulfill these vital functions, the Court has 
given them substantial leeway to regulate student conduct and has noted that 
the constitutional rights of students may, at times, differ than those of adults.61 
At the same time, the Court has also emphasized that this does not mean that 
school officials can yield unlimited power over students.62 The authority of 
school officials stops short of constitutional violations.63 Students are therefore 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 271–73 (discussing the responsibility and authority of 
school officials to determine what is appropriate and consistent with their educational goals); Bd. of 
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982) (noting that courts generally have little experience and 
expertise in educational policy); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (noting the important role that education 
plays in teaching students cultural values and preparing them for their futures); see also Safford Uni-
fied Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 n.1 (2009) (noting in the context of Fourth 
Amendment searches that courts should not override the judgement of school officials when it comes 
to regulating student behavior). 
 60 See Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (finding it appropriate for schools to censor 
certain types of vulgar language by reasoning, in part, that democratic values reject this type of lan-
guage in debates); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1981) (plurality opinion) (noting that the 
role that education plays in the maintenance of a democracy legitimizes schools’ interests in instilling 
values and respect in students (citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979))); Brown, 347 U.S. 
at 493 (referring to education as the “very foundation of good citizenship”). 
 61 See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 682–83 (validating a school’s regulation of speech at an assembly but 
noting that it would have been unconstitutional in an adult setting); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (emphasizing the importance of allowing school adminis-
trators to maintain the authority to regulate student behavior). Moreover, schools have even more 
discretion when they are regulating school curricula and other school-sponsored content, such as 
school newspapers or dramas. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 271 n.3 (applying a lesser degree of 
scrutiny to the school’s regulation of its newspaper because the school was, in essence, affirmatively 
promoting the content, unlike a case in which a school attempted to regulate a student’s personal ex-
pression that merely took place on school grounds (citing Papish v. Univ. of Mo. Bd. of Curators, 410 
U.S. 667 (1973))); cf. Pico, 457 U.S. at 862, 869 (finding that judicial review of a school’s removal of 
certain books from the library did not intrude on school curriculum and suggesting that school discre-
tion is likely higher in choosing curricula because of the duty to instill community values). 
 62 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (noting that schools are not allowed to impose total authority over 
students, as they are not “enclaves of totalitarianism”). 
 63 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 864–65 (noting that school officials’ discretion must be exercised in a 
manner that is consistent with the First Amendment); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107 (recognizing that 
constitutional protections are important to protect in schools and that the significant leeway given to 
school curricula does not grant schools the right to violate the Constitution). The fact that schools 
have the responsibility of preparing students for citizenship makes it even more important that stu-
dents’ constitutional rights remain protected. Pico, 457 U.S. at 864–65 (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
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still protected by the Constitution and courts can and should step in to protect 
their rights.64 
A majority of cases that challenge dress codes under the Equal Protection 
Clause come from the late 1960s and 1970s; many of which pertain to boys’ 
hair length requirements.65 Many dress codes have been challenged on other 
constitutional grounds, including the First Amendment and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 Nevertheless, precedents established 
by prior Equal Protection challenges are a useful guide in demonstrating how 
courts may analyze allegedly sexist dress codes under the Equal Protection 
Clause if and when they choose to do so.67 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (emphasizing that students do not lose their constitutional rights 
when entering school premises). In Tinker, a group of students challenged their suspension from 
school caused by the armbands worn to protest the Vietnam War. Id. at 504. In discussing First 
Amendment issues, the Court reaffirmed that despite the significant degree of control school officials 
have, constitutional protections still apply to students. Id. at 506–07. The Court ruled that in order for 
school officials to regulate speech, there must be a constitutional and legitimate reason, but student 
conduct that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of 
others” is not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 511, 513. 
 65 See Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1215 (2016) 
(noting the significant number of challenges to grooming codes in the 1960s and 1970s); see also 
Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 596 (discussing the lack of relevant cases in recent times and the fact that 
most come from the Vietnam War era). Although dress code litigation under the Equal Protection 
Clause has been minimal, dress codes have continued to be challenged on other grounds. Peltier, 384 
F. Supp. 3d at 595–96; see infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing other constitutional chal-
lenges to public-school dress codes). 
 66 Ben-Asher, supra note 65, at 1216 (noting that dress codes have been challenged under reli-
gious and transgender status grounds); see, e.g., A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 701 F. Supp. 2d 
863, 877 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (granting a Native American student’s request for a preliminary injunction 
against a school’s requirement that boys’ hair not cover their ears because it was inconsistent with his 
religious beliefs). Even if no First Amendment or Equal Protection challenges can be made, control 
over one’s personal appearance is still a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment and subject 
to rational basis review. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244, 247–48 (1976) (assuming a Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interest in matters of personal appearance and upholding a police depart-
ment’s grooming requirements under rational basis review). Moreover, Title IX, which bars schools 
from discriminating against students on the basis of sex, initially included a bar on discrimination in 
the form of rules dictating students’ appearances, but it was repealed during the Reagan Administra-
tion. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (setting forth a general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
sex in educational institutions that receive federal funding); 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b)(5) (2012) (prohibit-
ing schools from “on the basis of sex . . . discriminat[ing] against any person in the application of any 
rules of appearance”); Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 589 (discussing the repeal of the policy disallowing 
discriminatory appearance rules under Title IX); Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Using the Equal Protection 
Clause Post-VMI to Keep Gender Stereotypes Out of the Public School Dress Code Equation, 13 U.C. 
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 281, 285–86 (2009) (discussing the history of the prohibition of discrimina-
tory appearance rules in Title XI). 
 67 See supra notes 68–128 and accompanying text. 
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1. Hair Regulations 
As federal courts in the 1970s heard a significant number of challenges to 
dress codes requiring male students to keep their hair short, a circuit split 
emerged as to whether and how the Equal Protection Clause applied in this 
context.68 Several courts decided these cases without discussing Equal Protec-
tion.69 Others considered it but explicitly rejected its application, reasoning 
that disparate hair requirements were not a form of gender discrimination that 
belonged within the purview of the Equal Protection Clause.70 Some courts 
that considered Equal Protection arguments characterized the classification as 
one between males with different hair lengths, which did not raise issues of sex 
discrimination.71 Other courts considered challenges to hair length regulations 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Hayden, 743 F.3d at 577–78 (discussing the history of grooming standard jurisprudence 
and describing the approaches taken by various courts in the context of public-school dress codes and 
employment grooming standards); Zeller v. Donegal Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 602–03 
(3d Cir. 1975) (outlining the approaches of each circuit, with four circuits treating Equal Protection 
challenges with greater favor and five circuits being less willing to hear such challenges); Breese v. 
Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 165 n.17 (Alaska 1972) (discussing the disagreement amongst federal courts); 
Blaine v. Bd. of Educ., 502 P.2d 693, 697–98 (Kan. 1972) (discussing the circuits’ split in views as to 
whether there is constitutional protection and if so under which amendment it falls); Greenblatt, supra 
note 66, at 283 (noting 150 hair length cases between 1968 and 1977). The Supreme Court denied 
multiple petitions for certiorari. See Olff v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1045–46 
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that, given the numerous prior petitions, the Court should 
grant certiorari to decide whether hair-length decisions constituted a liberty within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and whether Equal Protection questions arose from this issue); see also 
Breese, 501 P.2d at 165 (noting silence on behalf of the Supreme Court with regard to the issue). 
 69 See Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260–61 (10th Cir. 1971) (discussing Due Process Clause 
and First Amendment claims); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284–85 (1st Cir. 1970) (finding 
a hair length requirement to be unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and declining to apply 
the First Amendment); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 705–06 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (addressing a hair 
length regulation under the Due Process Clause and First Amendment). 
 70 See King v. Saddleback Junior Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 1971) (rejecting a gen-
der-discrimination Equal Protection challenge to a school’s hair length requirement); see also Fagan v. 
Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1117–19 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (considering a hair regulation 
imposed by an employer on male employees, expressing doubt about the application of Equal Protec-
tion in public-school cases, and rejecting the argument that such a policy can be considered sex dis-
crimination). It should be noted, however, that King was decided several months before Reed, wherein 
the Supreme Court first invalidated a sex-based classification. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 77; King, 445 
F.2d at 939. 
 71 See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 616 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding a school policy limiting male 
students’ hair length to create a distinction between males with different hair lengths, and upholding it 
under rational basis scrutiny); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 415 (D. Vt. 1970) (characteriz-
ing the distinction as one between students who conform with the school’s grooming code and stu-
dents who violate it). In Karr, the court compared this case to one in which sex discrimination was 
found under the Equal Protection Clause but distinguished the case by adopting the characterization 
used by the district court, which viewed the classification as one between males with short hair and 
males with long hair. 460 F.2d at 616. 
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on different grounds but indicated being open to the application of Equal Pro-
tection if the parties had raised the argument.72 
In 1972, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Karr v. Schmidt adopted an 
ostensibly harsh stance against challenges to hair regulations in general.73 Dis-
trict courts within the Fifth Circuit, however, have interpreted that stance in 
different ways.74 The Karr court considered an Equal Protection argument but 
characterized the classification as one between boys with short and long hair.75 
The court distinguished the case from ones that found these policies to be dis-
criminatory on the basis of sex.76 The court ultimately proclaimed a per se rule 
deeming any hair length regulations to be constitutional and directed district 
courts to dismiss any constitutional challenges to them.77 Several decades lat-
er—after the application of Equal Protection to sex discrimination was first 
established in Reed v. Reed and later developed in United States v. Virginia—
district courts sought to determine whether the per se rule would still be appli-
cable to sex-discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause.78 For 
example, in the 2011 case, Sturgis v. Copiah County School District, the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi interpreted the Karr 
court’s focus on hair-length classifications, rather than sex-based classifica-
                                                                                                                           
 72 See, e.g., Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding that hair length re-
strictions implicate the Due Process Clause and briefly noting that they also have “overlapping Equal 
Protection Clause considerations”); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1971) (noting that 
other courts have considered sex discrimination in grooming codes under the Equal Protection Clause, 
but that a sex discrimination argument was never raised in the case at hand). 
 73 See Karr, 460 F.2d at 617–18 (finding public-school hair length requirements to be constitu-
tional as a general matter). 
 74 See Sturgis v. Copiah Cty. Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105065, at *4–5 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 
15, 2011) (discussing the Karr rule in the context of a policy requiring students to dress in conformity 
with their gender for yearbook photographs); A.A., 701 F. Supp. at 881–82 (discussing the applicabil-
ity of Karr in a challenge to a hair length requirement under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment); Fenceroy v. Morehouse Par. Sch. Bd., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 949, at *8–9 (W.D. La. 
Jan. 6, 2006) (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Karr after the Supreme Court deemed sex to 
be a quasi-suspect classification); infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (discussing various dis-
trict courts’ interpretation of Karr). 
 75 Karr, 460 F.2d at 616 (rejecting the notion that a classification between students of different 
hair lengths requires heightened scrutiny and upholding the policy under rational basis scrutiny). 
 76 See id. (noting that the district court had decided that a hair-length-based classification was the 
relevant theory under which to apply an Equal Protection analysis and proceeding to take the same 
approach). 
 77 Id. at 617–18. 
 78 See Sturgis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105065 at *4–5 (analyzing the relevance of the per se rule 
set forth in Karr); see also A.A., 701 F. Supp. at 881–82 (finding Karr inapplicable in a First Amend-
ment challenge to a hair-length requirement); Fenceroy, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 949 at *8–9 (finding 
Karr to still be applicable to claims of sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause because 
the Fifth Circuit continued to rely on it). See generally Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (articulating and 
building upon the standard of analysis for allegations of sex discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause); Reed, 404 U.S. at 77 (finding unequal treatment between men and women to be a violation of 
Equal Protection). 
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tions, as a way of avoiding the issue of sex-discrimination altogether.79 The 
Sturgis court thus denied a motion to dismiss a sex-discrimination Equal Pro-
tection challenge, reasoning that Karr’s silence on sex discrimination meant 
that its holding was not applicable.80 Meanwhile, another court recognized that 
the Supreme Court subsequently characterized gender as a quasi-suspect class, 
yet still found that Karr is good law and gender-based hair regulations are 
therefore constitutional.81 
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has consistently found hair-length 
requirements imposed on only male students to be a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.82 In 2014, in Hayden v. Greensburg Community School Corp., 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a short hair requirement im-
posed on members of a public high school boys’ basketball team.83 No such 
requirement existed for the girls’ team.84 When a seventh-grade boy was cut 
from the team for not cutting his hair, his parents sued the school alleging, 
amongst other things, sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.85 The school argued that, because the policy applied only to the boys’ 
basketball and baseball teams and not to other male sports teams, the policy 
was not discriminatory towards boys.86 The court rejected that argument and 
instead focused on the fact that boys who wanted to play basketball had to ad-
here to a burdensome policy, which girls who wanted to do the same were free 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Sturgis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105065, at *4–5 (evaluating a motion to dismiss in the 
context of mandated gendered clothing for yearbook photographs). 
 80 See id. (pointing to further distinctions between Karr and the case at hand, noting specifically 
that the Karr court had a more complete record to evaluate the school’s justifications and that it was 
addressing rules pertaining to the classroom, not yearbooks); see also A.A., 701 F. Supp. at 881–82 
(declining to follow Karr in discussion of hair-length requirements and the First Amendment). The 
school in Sturgis subsequently agreed to change its policy so that male and female students could 
wear the same outfit in their photographs. Ceara Sturgis, My Name Is Ceara Sturgis, and I Am Not a 
Troublemaker, ACLU (Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/lgbt-youth/my-name-
ceara-sturgis-and-i-am-not-troublemaker [https://perma.cc/853Q-3QYS] (describing the circumstanc-
es leading up to the lawsuit from the plaintiff’s perspective). 
 81 See Fenceroy, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 949, at *8–9 (noting that the Fifth Circuit continues to 
rely on Karr). Nonetheless, neither of the cases that the court cited show that the Fifth Circuit relied 
on Karr for gender-discrimination claims. Id. 
 82 See Hayden, 743 F.3d at 582 (ruling a school’s policy requiring only male basketball players to 
have short hair unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 
1266 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding a male-only short hair requirement to violate Equal Protection Clause 
because the school failed to explain why its proffered health and safety objectives applied only to boys 
or why the objectives could not have been achieved through narrower means such as shower caps or 
hair nets). 
 83 Hayden, 743 F.3d at 572. 
 84 Id. A similar requirement existed for the boys’ baseball team, but no such policy existed for 
any of the other male sports teams nor for any of the female teams. Id. 
 85 Id. at 573–74. The plaintiffs also argued that the dress code policy was a violation of Title IX 
and of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 574. 
 86 Id. at 579. 
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to ignore.87 The school also argued that the plaintiff lacked the requisite proof 
of discriminatory intent.88 The court, however, distinguished this case from 
ones in which the law was facially neutral and instead found that a rule im-
posed only on boys creates an explicit gender classification, which, on its own, 
served as proof of discriminatory intent.89 Because a classification was made 
on the basis of sex, the court then considered the school’s justifications: that 
short hair was necessary to keep a player’s hair out of his eyes while they play 
and to create a uniform look that fostered team unity.90 The court found that 
these were legitimate reasons for a hair length standard in general, but that 
girls’ teams have just as much of a need to keep their hair out of their eyes and 
to build team unity.91 Thus, because the rationale did not support the disparate 
treatment, there was no exceedingly persuasive justification for the sex-based 
classification.92 
2. Clothing Regulations 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in United States v. Virginia, 
some gender-based Equal Protection challenges to school clothing require-
ments were unsuccessful.93 Despite this, some students were able to effectively 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See id. (noting the fact that the hair length policy is only applicable to some, rather than all, 
boys does not automatically immunize it from constitutional challenges because the Equal Protection 
Clause protects individuals, not groups). The court also noted that it was irrelevant that boys who 
wanted to play other sports did not have to adhere to this policy because the individual plaintiff sought 
to play basketball, not the other sports. Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See id. (“This is a case of disparate treatment rather than disparate impact . . . . The intent to 
treat boys differently from girls is therefore evident from the one-sided nature of the policy.”); cf. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 277 (pertaining to a law that established a hiring preference for veterans, drawing 
no explicit line between genders but having a disparate impact because more men were being hired as 
a result). 
 90 See Hayden, 743 F.3d at 580–81 (discussing whether the school’s interests could justify the 
imposition of this rule on only boys). 
 91 Id. at 582. But see Dunham, 312 F. Supp. at 420 (rejecting under rational basis review the ar-
gument that a hair length rule was necessary for team unity, pointing out that there was no evidence 
that some students’ long hair diminished teamwork). 
 92 Hayden, 743 F.3d at 582. See generally Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (establishing the “exceeding-
ly persuasive justification” requirement on sex-based classifications). The Hayden court noted that its 
analysis was limited to the stipulated facts. 743 F.3d at 580. Therefore, the inference of discrimination 
might have been overcome by a showing that the male basketball team’s requirement was part of a 
broader grooming policy that imposed “comparable although not identical” policies on girls’ teams. 
Id. 
 93 See Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (rejecting an 
Equal Protection challenge to a public school’s disallowance of girls wearing tuxedos and boys wear-
ing dresses to the prom on grounds that the school merely required them to conform with community 
norms without distinguishing on the basis of sex); see also Richards, 424 F.2d at 1285–86 (invalidat-
ing a hair length requirement under the Due Process Clause, but suggesting that such a challenge 
would have been unsuccessful in the context of clothing). 
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challenge dress codes on other legal grounds.94 In 1973, the Idaho Supreme 
Court, analyzing a claim under the U.S. Constitution, invalidated a require-
ment that female students wear skirts or dresses rather than pants.95 The court 
characterized personal taste as a constitutionally protected right that required a 
substantial justification to deprive.96 At trial, the school called several witness-
es to provide evidence that girls wearing pants would have a harmful effect on 
the educational process, students’ morals and respect for authority, and the 
overall safety at school.97 There was a significant amount of conflicting testi-
mony offered by the students.98 Ultimately, the court upheld the trial judge’s 
rejection of the schools’ justifications and found that girls wearing pants to 
school would not endanger, disrupt, or instill poor morals on other students.99 
In 1969, in Scott v. Board of Education, a New York state court evaluating 
a similar dress code under the U.S. Constitution held that school officials have 
the authority to control student appearances, but only to the extent it is actually 
necessary to protect their safety or prevent distractions and interferences in the 
classroom.100 The court invalidated the prohibition of girls wearing pants, find-
ing no reasonable relation to health, safety, or education.101 Although the case 
was decided based on the scope of the school board’s authority, rather than the 
Equal Protection Clause, the court’s reasoning utilized similar concepts, 
grounding their decision in the fact that the policy applied only to girls and 
broadly prohibited all types of pants.102 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See, e.g., Johnson v. Joint Sch. Dist., 508 P.2d 547, 549 (Idaho 1973) (noting a constitutionally 
protected right to control one’s personal appearance); Scott v. Bd. of Educ., 305 N.Y.S.2d 601, 606 
(1969) (finding that a school only had authority to control students’ attire to the extent it was neces-
sary to protect students or to prevent disturbances or distractions in school). 
 95 Johnson, 508 P.2d at 548–49. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 548. In addition to these concerns, the school also argued that school property would be 
destroyed, the level of familiarity and physical contact between male and female students would in-
crease, and that the overall emotional attitude of the school district would suffer. Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Scott, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 603. 
 101 Id. at 606. The court noted that the facts that this requirement prohibited all types of pants and 
was broadly applied to all girls were an indication that this policy was influenced more by the 
schoolboard’s personal style preferences rather than any sort of concern about student’s safety or 
ability to focus in class. Id. 
 102 Id. In order to illustrate the lack of reasonable relation, the court drew comparisons to some 
examples that it deemed more acceptable: prohibiting all students who ride bikes from wearing bell-
bottoms in the interest of safety, a rule against skin-tight provocative pants in the interest of discipline, 
or a prohibition of pants with bells attached to them in the interest of maintaining order. Id. Moreover, 
it is worth noting that when providing the example of an acceptable prohibition against tight pants, the 
court characterized the type of pants to be ones that are so revealing that they “provoke or distract 
students of the opposite sex,” and did not in any way imply that the rule would only apply to females. 
Id. 
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Disputes over clothing requirements after 1996, though sparse, appear to 
be more consistent with gender-discrimination Equal Protection jurispru-
dence.103 In the 2019 case before the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District 
of North Carolina, Peltier v. Charter Day School Inc., a group of three students 
sued a North Carolina public charter school alleging an Equal Protection viola-
tion.104 The alleged violation stemmed from the school’s uniform policy re-
quiring girls to wear skirts or jumpers rather than pants or shorts.105 In analyz-
ing the Equal Protection claims, the court cited to Hayden on numerous occa-
sions, thereby indicating its intent to take a similar approach that the Seventh 
Circuit did to hair length regulations.106 The plaintiffs argued that the uniform 
reinforced outdated sex stereotypes and imposed an unequal burden on them 
by making them colder and less comfortable, restricting their freedom of 
movement, preventing them from engaging in various physical activities at 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See, e.g., Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 595–97 (denying a motion for summary judgment on an 
Equal Protection claim against a school dress code requiring female students to wear skirts or jump-
ers). One court, for example, denied a motion to dismiss an Equal Protection challenge to a yearbook 
policy requiring male students to wear tuxedos and female students to wear drapes. Sturgis, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 105065, at *4–6. The court did so in order to allow more facts to be developed so that it 
could ascertain whether the policy was facially discriminatory, or, as the school contended, facially 
neutral in order to determine whether intermediate scrutiny applied. Id. (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 
273). The court noted that if the policy was truly gender neutral, more facts were required in order to 
ascertain the extent to which the policy affected and burdened students. Id. On the other hand, if the 
policy was found to be facially discriminatory, then the school needed to offer a justification that 
would be deemed valid under intermediate scrutiny. Id. at *3–5 (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533). 
Meanwhile, another court rejected an Equal Protection claim when the dress code was facially gender-
neutral and the complaint lacked allegations of discriminatory intent. Long v. Bd. of Educ., 121 F. 
Supp. 2d 621, 623, 628 (W.D. Ky. 2000), aff’d, 21 Fed. App’x 252 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Feeney, 442 
U.S. at 274) (evaluating a dress code that regulated the permissible styles, colors, and logos of cloth-
ing, jewelry, and shoes, which the school contended was meant to prevent displays of gang affiliation, 
reduce violence and bullying amongst students, and enable people to identify non-student intruders). 
 104 Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 584–85. 
 105 Id. The school also regulated the types and amount of jewelry that girls could wear but prohib-
ited boys from wearing any jewelry. Id. at 586 n.3. Moreover, although the only hair regulation im-
posed on girls was a prohibition against “excessive or radical haircuts and colors,” which also was 
imposed on boys, boys also had to keep their hair “neatly trimmed” and follow certain hair-length 
requirements. Id. The plaintiffs, however, only challenged the uniform policy prohibiting girls from 
wearing pants or slacks. Id. at 587. Moreover, there were several exceptions to the uniform require-
ment. Id. For example, students were not required to adhere to the uniform policy for certain types of 
class trips and as a reward for certain types of encouraged behavior. Id. Students were also allowed to 
wear school-approved athletic clothing on days in which they attended physical education class. Id. 
 106 See id. at 595–97 (discussing the Equal Protection claim); see also Hayden, 743 F.3d at 582 
(finding a school athletic code’s hair length policy unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause 
because it applied only to the boys’ baseball team and not girls and lacked an exceedingly persuasive 
justification for the differential treatment). The Peltier court interpreted the Hayden court’s specific 
standard of analysis to slightly differ from Virginia’s intermediate scrutiny, characterizing Hayden’s 
analysis as a “comparable burdens standard.” Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 596 (internal quotations 
omitted). Because the Peltier court found that the dress code rule in question failed both tests, howev-
er, it passed on the question of whether one or both standards would apply. Id. Regardless, the court 
drew guidance from Hayden throughout the Equal Protection analysis. Id. at 596–97. 
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recess, and disrupting and limiting their learning opportunities.107 The defend-
ants pointed to the fact that the school was heavily focused on instilling tradi-
tional values in students and argued that this requirement, along with the other 
uniform rules, contributed to this mission.108 Though they did not point to any 
specific connection between girls wearing skirts and the fulfillment of their 
goal, the defendants argued that all of the requirements functioned together to 
achieve this goal.109 Moreover, they argued that the sex-differentiated require-
ments in the uniform policy facilitated appropriate interactions between mem-
bers of the opposite sex.110 The court rejected the defendants’ arguments, how-
ever, pointing to the fact that this rule was inconsistent with community norms 
and that there was no evidence that it fulfilled its purported purpose.111 Ulti-
mately, because the school was unable to justify a sex-specific requirement that 
made girls uncomfortable, prevented them from participating in the same ac-
tivities as boys, and distracted them during class, the court found that the skirt 
requirement was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.112 
3. Jewelry Cases 
In addition to clothing and hair requirements, there have been a number 
of challenges to school prohibitions on males wearing earrings.113 In 1987, 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 587, 597. The skirts distracted the female students by making them 
have to pay close attention to their leg placement while sitting in class. Id. at 587. Moreover, it caused 
them to refrain from certain athletic activities during recess because they worried that they would 
inadvertently expose themselves. Id. The plaintiffs had also testified that skirts, rather than pants, were 
less comfortable for them and that they made them colder in the winter. Id. Ultimately, the plaintiffs 
felt as if these effects of the skirt requirement indicated to them that their “comfort and freedom to 
engage in physical activity are less important than those of their male classmates.” Id. 
 108 Id. at 587, 596. 
 109 Id. at 587–88, 596. 
 110 Id. at 596. More specifically, the defendants argued that the “visual cues” of the skirts facili-
tated respect between boys and girls. Id. 
 111 Id. The court acknowledged that sex-differentiated dress requirements might be constitutional 
if they were consistent with community standards, but noted the widespread commonality of girls and 
women wearing pants in today’s society. Id. Moreover, the court pointed to the fact that there were 
several circumstances that regularly led to a temporary lapse of the skirt requirement and that there 
was no evidence that students of the opposite sex acted differently towards each other during those 
times. See id. (discussing the frequency of physical education classes, special occasions, and field 
trips, all of which led to girls being allowed to wear pants). When the school board members were 
deposed, they were unable to explain why the skirt requirement contributed to the school’s general 
mission. Id. 
 112 Id. at 597. The court also noted that the defendants were unable to prove that the policy im-
posed comparable burdens on male students. Id. Although boys had certain sex-specific rules, such as 
a requirement that they wear belts, there was no proof that this rule had a similar burdensome effect 
on male students. See id. (“[T]he skirts requirement causes the girls to suffer a burden the boys do not, 
simply because they are female.”). 
 113See, e.g., Olesen v. Bd. of Educ., 676 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Hines v. Caston Sch. 
Corp., 651 N.E.2d 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Jones v. W.T. Henning Elem. Sch. Principal, 721 So. 2d 
530 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
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before the U.S. District Court of Northern Illinois in Olesen v. Board of Educa-
tion, a male high school student brought suit after being suspended from 
school multiple times for wearing an earring.114 The school enacted the prohi-
bition against boys wearing earrings after discovering that related gang activity 
led to violence, intimidation, and attempted recruitment within the school.115 In 
order to address the problem, the school created a gang policy that not only 
banned earrings worn by male students, which the school administration be-
lieved to be symbolic of gang affiliation, but also banned any sort of gang 
symbolism in students’ clothing, speech, and behavior.116 The court upheld the 
school’s policy, reasoning that the school board had a legitimate interest in cur-
tailing gang activity.117 The school proved that earrings tended to symbolize 
gang membership when boys wore them, whereas girls symbolized member-
ship differently.118 There was therefore a close enough relationship between the 
classification and the school’s interest.119 
In 1995, in Hines v. Caston School Corp., the Indiana Court of Appeals 
found that an elementary school’s suspension of a fourth-grade boy for wear-
ing earrings was acceptable under the U.S. Constitution.120 The court noted 
that the policy prohibited all students from wearing jewelry that was incon-
sistent with community norms and that there was evidence that boys wearing 
earrings was in fact abnormal in the community.121 Because the school had a 
                                                                                                                           
 114 Olesen, 676 F. Supp. at 821. 
 115 Id. at 821–22. 
 116 Id. The school board had enacted several rules prohibiting gang activity and demonstrations of 
affiliation, but left room for the schools within the district to implement their own rules as well. Id. at 
822. The school that the plaintiff attended prohibited male students wearing earrings because they 
found that many male students wore earrings to symbolize their gang affiliations. Id. 
 117 Id. at 823 (noting the school’s interest in student wellness and safety and comparing this situa-
tion to hair length cases in which schools were unable to provide a rational basis for their require-
ments). The court also noted that unlike hair length requirements, which affect students both in and 
out of school, a ban on jewelry does not affect one’s ability to control their appearance outside of 
school. Id. It should be noted that the court’s comparison of this case to those regarding hair length 
requirements took place during its discussion of First Amendment claims, which are subject to a 
greater level of scrutiny than Equal Protection gender discrimination claims. Id. at 822–23; see Har-
bach, supra note 58, at 1053 (noting that First Amendment challenges are typically analyzed under 
strict scrutiny). 
 118 Olesen, 676 F. Supp. at 823 (noting that the ways in which girls typically symbolized gang 
affiliation were also banned under the dress code). 
 119 See id. (noting that the school demonstrated that earrings on boys were indicative of gang 
affiliation). 
 120 Hines, 651 N.E.2d at 335–36. 
 121 See id. (referring to evidence that the town was “politically and religiously conservative” and 
earrings were regarded as feminine within the community). Although the elementary school’s policy 
was gender neutral, it was written after the plaintiff was already reprimanded for wearing earrings to 
school. Id. at 331. The school had originally informed the boy’s parents that his earrings were a viola-
tion of the school’s dress code because, although the elementary school had no written dress code, it 
was on the same campus as the district’s middle and high school, which specifically prohibited males 
from wearing earrings. Id. The boy continued wearing his earring to school with no consequence until 
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legitimate interest in enforcing community norms as a means of teaching dis-
cipline, the court found no violation of Equal Protection.122 Moreover, while 
discussing Due Process claims, the court rejected a number of justifications 
despite these claims being subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny.123 Specifically, 
the court rejected the argument that the rule prevented gangs, cults, and homo-
sexuality, reasoning that there was no evidence of a correlation between male 
earrings and these activities, nor evidence that such activities were present in 
the school.124 Furthermore, the school’s argument that the rule was necessary 
for boys’ safety in gym class failed because female students were allowed to 
wear earrings and were able to prevent injury by simply taking their earrings 
out.125 Similarly, in 1998 in Jones v. W.T. Henning Elementary School Princi-
pal, the Louisiana Court of Appeals upheld a specific ban on male earrings in 
an elementary school, finding persuasive justification in three legitimate 
school objectives: preventing class distraction, instilling respect for authority, 
and encouraging conformation to community norms.126 The court noted that 
the main purpose of a school is to educate their students and that this could not 
be achieved when there was a lack of discipline and order.127 Moreover, the 
school was able to provide proof that male earrings were distracting in elemen-
tary schools because it was so uncommon, and the court accepted the proposi-
tion that the rule reflected the community’s values.128 
II. TAKE-AWAYS FROM DRESS CODE LITIGATION: WHEN DO THEY 
VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION? 
In order to analyze the validity of a dress code under the Equal Protection 
Clause, courts must first ascertain what level of scrutiny is warranted.129 In 
                                                                                                                           
the following school year when the school board added a provision to the elementary school handbook 
requiring that students only wear jewelry that conforms with community standards. Id. After this, he 
again continued to wear earrings to school and, ultimately, his refusal to comply with the newly enact-
ed dress code resulted in his temporary suspension from school. Id. 
 122 See id. at 336 (noting that this method of instilling discipline is a “legitimate educational func-
tion”). 
 123 See id. at 334–35 (applying rational basis review to the claim that students have a liberty inter-
est in controlling their personal appearances). 
 124 See id. at 335 (noting that a member of the schoolboard conceded that he did not know of any 
gang or homosexual activity in the school and that he did not think that earrings were always associat-
ed with male gang activity). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Jones, 721 So. 2d at 532. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See Sturgis v. Copiah Cty. Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105065, at *5–6 (S.D. Miss. 
Sept. 15, 2011) (demonstrating that the level of scrutiny applied in the analysis would depend on 
whether the facts support a finding of there being a gender-based classification). See generally United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (finding that heightened scrutiny is required when ana-
lyzing a law that makes a classification on the basis of sex). 
2019] Equal Protection and School Dress Codes 2567 
other words, courts must first determine whether an analysis of the dress code 
requires heightened scrutiny in that the dress code contains either a sex-based 
classification or a policy with an intentionally disparate impact.130 If height-
ened scrutiny is triggered, then the requirements set forth in United States v. 
Virginia must be met—there must be an exceedingly persuasive justification 
with a substantial connection to the sex-based classification.131 Section A of 
this Part elaborates on the circumstances in which heightened scrutiny may be 
triggered.132 Section B discusses the various justifications that have been 
deemed sufficiently persuasive and the extent to which a substantial connec-
tion must be proven.133 
A. The Preliminary Step: Arriving at Heightened Scrutiny 
When a law or policy does not make an explicit sex-based distinction, it 
may nevertheless be subject to an Equal Protection challenge.134 In these cases, 
courts must ascertain whether the policy is gender neutral or whether it is im-
plicitly based on gender.135 If it is genuinely gender neutral, courts must then 
determine if the law nevertheless has a disproportionate impact on one gender 
in a way that reflects intentional gender discrimination.136 A policy will be 
deemed invalid if there is a finding of purposeful discrimination, in that the 
disproportionate effects on one gender were an intended result of the policy.137 
Thus, dress code rules that apply either identical or comparable rules to male 
and female students are unlikely to receive heightened scrutiny unless they are 
found to have an intentionally disproportionate impact on one gender.138 Con-
                                                                                                                           
 130 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (holding that laws will require 
exceedingly persuasive justifications if they are “overtly or covertly” based on sex); Sturgis, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105065, at *6 (noting that even if the policy in question is found to be gender neu-
tral, it will still require intermediate scrutiny if there is a finding of discriminatory intent). 
 131 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (articulating the standard of analysis for sex-based classifica-
tions under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 132 See infra notes 134–150 and accompanying text. 
 133 See infra notes 151–175 and accompanying text. 
 134 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259 (analyzing a Massachusetts law that gave hiring preferences to 
veterans for public service positions). 
 135 See id. at 274 (describing the analytical framework for gender neutral laws, which consists of a 
two-step inquiry into, first, whether the law is genuinely gender neutral and, second, whether it re-
flects intentional discrimination). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 274, 279. 
 138 See id. at 274 (noting that a disproportionate impact will only be unconstitutional if it is found 
to be intentional); Long v. Bd. of Educ., 121 F. Supp. 2d 621, 628 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (rejecting Equal 
Protection challenges because the law was facially neutral), aff’d 21 Fed. App’x 252 (6th Cir. 2001); 
see also Sturgis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105065, at *3–7 (denying a motion to dismiss an Equal Pro-
tection claim against a school’s yearbook policy requiring boys to wear tuxedos and girls to wear 
skirts (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273)); Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 
(S.D. Ohio 1987) (upholding a school dance dress policy because it applied equally to males and fe-
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versely, if the dress code is facially gender neutral, yet implicitly based on 
gender, it will be treated as if it has made a classification on the basis of sex 
and will therefore receive heightened scrutiny.139 
In 2000 before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Ken-
tucky, in Long v. Board of Education, the dress code at issue regulated the 
permissible styles, colors, and logos of clothing as well as the types of jewelry 
and shoes.140 The dress code was enacted in order to increase student safety 
after school administrators noticed a number of problems caused by student 
attire, including gang affiliation and bullying.141 The court noted that this was a 
gender neutral code and that in order to prevail on an Equal Protection chal-
lenge, the plaintiffs would have to prove a disparate impact and intentional 
discrimination.142 Because there were no allegations of discriminatory intent, 
the court rejected the Equal Protection claim.143 Similarly, in a 1987 case, 
Harper v. Edgewood Board of Education, the U.S. District Court for the 
                                                                                                                           
males by requiring all students to dress in accordance with community norms). The Supreme Court 
has noted that a policy’s foreseeably inevitable harmful impact on one gender creates a strong infer-
ence that it was intentional. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.25. In Sturgis, the school argued that the dress 
code was gender neutral because both boys and girls were required to wear certain items of clothing. 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105065, at *4. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, asserted that the fact that there 
is a specific requirement imposed on each gender indicated that the policy had a facial gender classifi-
cation. Id. The court noted that both arguments had some merit, but that more facts were needed in 
order to ascertain the actual wording of the policy. Id. at *4, *6 n.2 (noting that the policy was not in 
writing). Lastly, the court observed that if the policy was gender neutral, then the facts would have to 
be considered under the framework of Personal Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney. Id. at *6–
7. See generally Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (setting forth the framework for analyzing gender neutral 
policies). 
 139 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (discussing the first step of the gender-neutral analysis that seeks 
to ascertain whether the law is, in fact, genuinely gender neutral and not implicitly gendered). Some 
schools with facially gender-neutral dress codes have given students and parents the impression of 
being implicitly based on gender when, for example, the list of prohibited clothing items contains only 
clothing that is traditionally worn by girls. See Finan, supra note 11 (noting that most of the banned 
clothing in the dress code was aimed at what female students would wear and that in 2016–2017 every 
student suspended for violating the dress code was female and in the following year, 60% were fe-
male); see also Dress Code, AUSTIN INDEP. SCH. DIST., https://www.austinisd.org/¶ family-support/
dress-code [https://perma.cc/SQZ8-PCG5] (prohibiting clothing such as halter tops and spaghetti 
straps). Another school faced similar criticism for showing students a video that purported to teach 
them about dress code violations in which only female students were featured. See Monica Hernandez, 
Principal Apologizes After ‘Sexist’ Dress Code Video Upsets Parents, Students, WFAA-TV (Aug. 17, 
2018), https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/principal-apologizes-after-sexist-dress-code-video-upsets-
parents-students/287-585257109 [https://perma.cc/4RHA-RBV5]. 
 140 Long, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 623. For example, the dress code required that all button-down shirts 
be buttoned from the top button down, a solid color with no logos, and be made of cotton or a cotton 
blend. Id. at 629. Similarly, pants were required to be either khaki-colored or black, have a visible 
belt, and be worn at the waist. Id. 
 141 Id. at 623 (listing the safety goals of the dress code as eliminating the display of gang affilia-
tion, preventing violence and bullying based on stude¶ nts’ clothing, and enabling people to identify 
non-student intruders). 
 142 Id. at 628 (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274). 
 143 Id. 
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Southern District of Ohio rejected an Equal Protection challenge when a high 
school ejected two students from the prom because the male student wore a 
dress and the female wore a tuxedo.144 The court reasoned that the school’s 
dress code made no classification on the basis of sex; it merely required all 
students to conform to community norms.145 
Moreover, a school may be able to impose facially different requirements 
on boys and girls if they are similar in nature.146 For example, in the 2014 case, 
Hayden v. Greensburg Community School Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the court overturned a short hair requirement on a boys’ basketball team, but 
noted that the school might have prevailed had they shown that their require-
ment was part of a broader policy that imposed similar requirements on girls’ 
teams.147 
Lastly, a policy need not affect every single member of one sex in order 
for it to be viewed as making a distinction on the basis of sex.148 In Hayden, 
for example, it was enough that a short hair requirement was imposed on a 
boys’ sports team, but not the girls’ equivalent, regardless of the fact that other 
boys’ teams had no such rule.149 Therefore, when a requirement is imposed on 
only some members of one gender, it is still likely to be treated as having an 
explicit gender classification regardless of how many people within the gender 
it affects.150 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Harper, 655 F. Supp. at 1354, 1356. 
 145 Id. But see Sturgis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105065, at *3–7 (denying a motion to dismiss a 
challenge to a yearbook photo requirement that males wear tuxedos and females wear drapes because 
both the plaintiff’s argument that the policy constituted sex stereotyping and the defendant’s argument 
that the policy was sex-neutral had merit). 
 146 See Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 580–81 (7th Cir. 2014) (discuss-
ing the possibility of schools prevailing when there is an equal burden). 
 147 Id. at 580. More specifically, the court noted that they had limited facts in the record to review 
and that they lacked information about the full scope of the school’s policies. Id. Had they been able 
to review the whole policy, it would have been possible, though not definite, that it would have been 
acceptable. See id.; see also Peltier v. Charter Day Sch., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 579, 597 (E.D.N.C. 
2019) (finding a prohibition on girls wearing pants to be unconstitutional and noting that there were 
no comparably burdensome rules on boys). 
 148 See Hayden, 743 F.3d at 582 (finding a hair-length requirement to be unconstitutional when it 
applied to two boys’ sports teams, despite the fact that the other boys’ sports teams had no such re-
quirement imposed on them). 
 149 See id. at 579 (rejecting the school’s argument that the fact that only boys who sought to play 
basketball or baseball had to cut their hair meant that the classification was based on boys’ desired 
athletic activities rather than gender). 
 150 See id. (finding the policy in question to be one that “draws an explicit gender line” and thus 
not requiring the showing of intentional discrimination that is needed in cases of gender-neutral poli-
cies). 
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B. Acceptable School Justifications and their Connections  
to the Gender-Based Classifications 
Once it has been determined that heightened scrutiny is warranted, 
schools bear the burden of providing an exceedingly persuasive justification 
that bears a substantial relation to the sex-based classification.151 The health 
and safety of students are generally acceptable school interests, provided that 
schools prove why that interest is best served by imposing a requirement on 
only one gender.152 As a result, it would be acceptable for a school to seek to 
prevent injury during sports practice or gym class by making sure that all stu-
dents are keeping their hair out of eyes or preventing them from wearing jew-
elry.153 At the same time, courts have made it clear that these justifications will 
not support a sex-based classification if the potential safety risk is equally haz-
ardous to the other gender.154 Consequently, if girls can avoid injury in gym 
class without adhering to the requirement imposed on boys, for example by 
tying their hair back or removing their jewelry, then the policy is likely lacking 
the requisite relation between the school’s interest and the classification.155 
Moreover, the safety concern must be genuine.156 In Hines v. Caston School 
Corp., the court questioned the genuineness of the school’s concern about boys 
sustaining injuries during gym class because of their earrings.157 These injuries 
were clearly avoidable without requiring a prohibition on boys wearing ear-
rings, as demonstrated by the fact that girls avoided them by taking their ear-
                                                                                                                           
 151 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (articulating the standard of analysis for sex-based classifica-
tions). 
 152 See Hines v. Caston Sch. Corp., 651 N.E.2d 330, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting a safety 
justification for a male earring ban due to evidence that female students were able to wear earrings 
and avoid injuries); Scott v. Bd. of Educ., 305 N.Y.S.2d 601, 606 (1969) (accepting a school’s general 
authority to impose dress requirements that protect students’ safety but finding that the authority did 
not allow the school to prohibit girls from wearing pants rather than skirts); see also Olesen v. Bd. of 
Educ., 676 F.Supp. 820, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (finding a school’s interest in ensuring the safety and 
overall well-being of their students by seeking to minimize gang activity to be a rational basis for the 
prohibition of males wearing earrings). 
 153 See Hayden, 743 F.3d at 580 (discussing the school’s desire to keep boys’ hair out of their 
faces while playing basketball); Hines, 651 N.E.2d at 334 (noting the school’s argument that earrings 
may cause injury in gym class). 
 154 See Hayden, 743 F.3d at 580–81 (invalidating a hair length requirement imposed on boys 
when the safety justification was equally applicable to girls); Hines, 651 N.E.2d at 335 (finding the 
school’s proffered safety justification to be invalid because it did not support the distinction between 
males and females). 
 155 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 156 See Hines, 651 N.E.2d at 335 (expressing doubt as to whether safety was a genuine motivation 
behind the school’s ban on boys wearing earrings); Scott, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 606 (finding that a ban on 
girls wearing pants appeared to be driven more by style preference than safety). 
 157 Hines, 651 N.E.2d at 335. The school argued that boys were more likely to roughhouse during 
gym class than girls and thus more likely to be injured when wearing earrings. Id. at 334. The court 
rejected this contention, however, because boys could just as easily take their earrings out before 
class. Id. at 335. 
2019] Equal Protection and School Dress Codes 2571 
rings out before that class.158 Similarly, in 1969, in Scott v. Board of Education, 
a New York state court analyzing a claim under the United States Constitution 
found that a proscription of girls wearing any type of slacks had no relation-
ship to students’ safety.159 The court pointed to the irrationality of the fact that 
the rule applied only to females and prohibited all types of pants.160 In doing 
so, the court compared the rule to a hypothetical one that prohibited any stu-
dent who rides a bike from wearing bellbottomed pants as a means of showing 
when safety is actually a genuine concern.161 
The prevention of classroom distractions has also been an acceptable 
school interest provided, again, that there is a sufficient connection between 
the policy and the concern about disruption.162 The Scott court invalidated a 
school’s requirement that girls wear dresses or skirts under a standard of re-
view that required only a reasonable relationship to the prevention of distrac-
tion, rather than a substantial connection.163 The court found an insufficient 
link between a broad prohibition of girls wearing pants and the goal of pre-
venting distraction.164 In doing so, the court discussed hypothetical examples 
of rules that would bear a sufficient relationship, those being a ban on clothing 
worn by either gender if it made noise or was overly provocative to the other 
gender.165 Moreover, the extent to which the proscribed clothing or appearance 
is inconsistent with trends or uncommon within the community may, at least in 
part, play a role in the likelihood of this justification succeeding, as it makes it 
more likely that the clothing will be distracting.166 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See id. at 335. 
 159 Scott, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 606. Although this case was not decided on Equal Protection grounds, 
the court’s reasoning contemplates Equal Protection concerns. See id. (finding no reasonable relation-
ship because the rule was only applied to female students). 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See Jones v. W.T. Henning Elem. Sch. Principal, 721 So. 2d 530, 532 (La. Ct. App. 1998) 
(noting that schools cannot fulfill their educational purposes when there is too much disruption); Scott, 
305 N.Y.S.2d at 606 (finding that the prevention of classroom distraction is a legitimate school inter-
est but limiting the school’s authority to regulate clothing only to the extent that is actually necessary 
to prevent distraction); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969) (noting that the First Amendment does not protect student conduct if it “materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder”); Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 596 (rejecting an argument 
that a uniform requiring girls to wear skirts instead of pants helps maintain classroom order because 
the defendants failed to demonstrate how the policy actually fulfilled that goal). 
 163 Scott, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 606. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 See Jones, 721 So. 2d at 532 (discussing the need for teachers to maintain classroom focus). 
The court here found that a school’s distraction justification was sufficiently connected to its prohibi-
tion of boys wearing earrings, pointing to the fact that it was uncommon for boys to wear earrings in 
elementary schools. Id. Because this was a rare occurrence, the court noted, it was more likely to dis-
tract other students and could therefore be prohibited. See id. (upholding prohibition of male earrings). 
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A school’s desire to instill morals, discipline, and a sense of respect in 
students has also been deemed a legitimate interest that may be served by re-
quiring student attire to comply with community norms.167 The extent to which 
schools must prove a connection is not entirely clear, however, as several 
courts that have discussed this justification have only done so briefly.168 The 
Hines court discussed the matter in more detail and upheld a ban on boys 
wearing earrings because they were inconsistent with community norms.169 
The court reasoned that the school was justified in seeking to instill communi-
ty values and pointed to specific evidence of the conservative nature of the 
community to demonstrate that it was, in fact, inconsistent with norms.170 
Conversely, an Idaho state court found that the interest of instilling good mor-
als on students did not justify a requirement that girls wear skirts or dresses 
because it found no link between girls wearing pants and bad morals.171 
There are a number of other justifications that courts have acknowledged 
to be legitimate interests provided that there is a sufficient relationship be-
tween the school’s interest and dress code policy.172 For example, a school may 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See Hines, 651 N.E.2d at 335–36 (noting evidence that encouraging conformity to community 
norms discourages rebelliousness); Jones, 721 So. 2d at 532 (finding that a school’s desire to instill 
respect is a legitimate interest that may be served by enforcing community norms); Scott, 305 
N.Y.S.2d at 606 (noting the school’s authority to enforce dress policies for the purpose of instilling 
discipline). A school’s desire to instill discipline by enforcing a dress code that is inconsistent with 
community norms, however, is unlikely to be accepted. See Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 595–97 (over-
turning a uniform policy that was inconsistent with community norms and rejecting the defendants’ 
argument that the policy helped instill discipline). In Peltier, the court found a uniform policy to be 
unconstitutional when it required female students to wear skirts rather than pants, noting specifically 
that the requirement was inconsistent with community norms. Id. at 596 (noting that women have 
been allowed to wear pants since the 1970s). The school argued that the policy helped instill discipline 
and promoted appropriate and respectful interactions between male and female students. Id. In reject-
ing this argument, the court relied primarily on the lack of evidence that this goal was served by the 
rule and the lack of evidence that such a rule was consistent with norms within that county or state. Id. 
at 597. 
 168 See Jones, 721 So. 2d at 532 (accepting the community norms justification without discussing 
the specific proof of what these norms were); Scott, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 606 (finding that a prohibition 
against girls wearing pants did not reasonably relate to discipline simply because the policy applied to 
only females and did not specify the type of pants prohibited, without discussing any arguments made 
by the school). 
 169 Hines, 651 N.E.2d at 335–36. 
 170 Id.; see Jones, 721 So. 2d at 532 (finding that a school’s enforcement of community values 
was a legitimate and justifiable means of instilling discipline and respect for authority and upholding a 
ban on boys’ earrings without citing to evidence as to how this ban defied these values). 
 171 See Johnson v. Joint Sch. Dist., 508 P.2d 547, 548–49 (Idaho 1973) (upholding the trial 
court’s finding that girls wearing pants did not instill bad morals under rational basis review within 
the context of the Due Process Clause); see also Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 596–97 (finding no evi-
dence that requiring females to wear skirts helped promote discipline and respect and noting that the 
rule was inconsistent with community norms). 
 172 See Hayden, 743 F.3d at 582 (discussing school interest in having their athletic teams present 
an appearance of unity); Olesen, 676 F. Supp. at 823 (accepting school interest in curtailing gang 
activity); Hines, 651 N.E.2d at 335 (discussing school interest in curtailing gang activity); see also 
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be justified in seeking an appearance of unity in their sports teams, but such a 
desire is equally applicable to boys’ and girls’ teams and would not support 
imposing an appearance requirement on only the boys’ teams.173 Similarly, 
curtailing gang activity has often been an accepted justification for preventing 
boys from wearing earrings when the school proves that they have a genuine 
concern about gang activity and that earrings are only symbolic of gang affilia-
tion when worn by boys.174 Meanwhile, this justification may fail when there 
is no proof of gang activity within the community nor links between gang affil-
iation and boys wearing earrings.175 
III. A MODERN ANALYSIS OF DRESS CODE JURISPRUDENCE 
Although a number of courts in the past found that gender-based disparate 
dress or appearance requirements did not fall within the scope of the Equal 
Protection Clause, many of these decisions came from the 1960s and 1970s, 
when sex-discrimination Equal Protection jurisprudence had either not yet 
been established or was still in its early stages.176 Given this fact, as well as the 
Supreme Court’s indication that new societal points of view can be relevant, 
courts are likely to be more willing to hear these types of Equal Protection 
challenges today.177 
                                                                                                                           
Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 596 (noting the school’s proffered justification in promoting appropriate 
conduct between members of the opposite sex, but declining to explicitly decide whether this would 
be an acceptable justification because, “even assuming these are legitimate goals,” the defendants 
failed to offer proof that they were being served). 
 173 See Hayden, 743 F.3d at 582 (finding that the desire to look unified did not support the dispar-
ate hair length imposition on the boys’ basketball team because there was no evidence that the school 
sought a similar image for the girls’ teams or other boys’ sports teams). 
 174 See Olesen, 676 F. Supp. at 821, 823 (accepting the school’s justification that the ban on ear-
rings was for the purpose of curtailing gang activity). Here, the school was able to prove that they had 
a significant number of problems with gang activity and offered evidence that boys wearing earrings 
symbolized gang affiliation but that girls wearing earrings did not. Id. at 822–23. 
 175 See Hines, 651 N.E.2d at 335 (rejecting the school’s gang-related justification because of 
insufficient evidence). 
 176 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (noting that the Court first accepted a 
sex-discrimination Equal Protection argument in 1971); see, e.g., King v. Saddleback Junior Coll. 
Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding gender-based differential treatment to pose no prob-
lem under the Equal Protection Clause). Moreover, even after the Supreme Court recognized gender-
based classifications as falling under the Equal Protection Clause, the level of scrutiny that the Court 
applied was inconsistent, which added more uncertainty to the weight of the earlier dress code cases. 
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (mandating strict scrutiny); Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (applying rational basis review). 
 177 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing federal courts’ consideration of new 
societal insights in Equal Protection analyses). See generally Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 
1678, 1690 (2017) (acknowledging the role that evolving societal views play in Equal Protection cases 
(citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015))); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663, 669 (1966) (noting that the definition of equality can change over time as it is not bound by ideas 
of the past). 
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When schools are able to point to a comprehensive dress policy that im-
poses comparable rules on both genders, they are likely to defeat an Equal Pro-
tection challenge provided that the requirements are gender neutral or equally 
burdensome.178 When a policy either is gender-neutral but unevenly en-
forced179 or contains an explicitly gendered classification, a school will be re-
quired to point to a valid objective, such as students’ well-being, focus, or mo-
rality.180 Courts will only find the justification to be sufficiently related to the 
classification if the school can offer proof that it is based on genuine con-
cerns.181 
Given the commonly held view that it is the job of school officials, not of 
judges, to decide the best ways to implement educational policies, it is possible 
that some deference would be given to a school’s proffered justification for 
their dress codes.182 At the same time, courts have made it clear that this policy 
does not give school officials free reign over their students and that they will 
                                                                                                                           
 178 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (setting forth the standard of 
analysis for gender-neutral policies); Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 581 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (discussing the possibility that comprehensive dress codes may be more likely to withstand 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause); Long v. Bd. of Educ., 121 F. Supp. 2d 621, 628 (W.D. 
Ky. 2000), aff’d 21 Fed. App’x 252 (6th Cir. 2001), (applying the framework for analyzing gender-
neutral laws and upholding the dress code due to insufficient showing of intentional discrimination). 
 179 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (noting that facially gender-neutral laws may still “covert[ly]” be 
made with gender in mind); see also Hines v. Caston Sch. Corp., 651 N.E.2d 330, 335–36 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1995) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a gender-neutral dress code that required that students’ 
jewelry conform with community standards when one such standard was that boys generally do not 
wear earrings). 
 180 See supra notes 151–175 and accompanying text (discussing the various justifications that 
courts have accepted and the requisite relationship between the school’s objective and the sex-based 
classification employed). 
 181 See supra notes 151–175 and accompanying text. 
 182 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (expressing the Supreme 
Court’s view that school officials, not judges, take on the role of educating children); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (noting that school officials need sufficient 
authority over students in order to properly educate them); Hayden, 743 F.3d at 582 (noting that 
schools are given flexibility in order to fulfill their educational responsibilities); Peltier v. Charter Day 
Sch., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 579, 595 (E.D.N.C. 2019) (discussing courts’ hesitation to interfere with 
everyday educational issues but noting that students nevertheless have constitutional rights that must 
be protected). See generally supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s approach to school authority and constitutional issues). This is because the Court has consist-
ently emphasized that school administrators possess a certain expertise in educational matters, which 
judges lack. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 n.1 (2009) (noting in 
the context of the Fourth Amendment that school administrators should be able to prescribe behavior-
al standards for students without interference from courts); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 
(1982) (noting that courts do not have the expertise to address educational policies); Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (expressing concern about judicial intervention in schools’ day-to-
day matters). 
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step in when necessary to protect students’ constitutional rights.183 Consistent 
with this notion and with sex-discrimination Equal Protection jurisprudence, 
courts reviewing school dress codes have, in fact, taken close looks at schools’ 
justifications in order to ensure that they are genuine.184 
Section A of this Part applies the standard and guidance set forth in Unit-
ed States v. Virginia and subsequent Supreme Court cases to earlier challenges 
to dress codes.185 Section B argues that, given the progression of the Supreme 
Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence, the notion that restrictive dress codes 
imposed on girls are necessary to prevent classroom distraction may no longer 
suffice to justify a sex-based classification.186 
A. Re-Examining Older Cases in Light of Subsequent Supreme Court  
Equal Protection Jurisprudence 
Most dress code case law was established before the Supreme Court’s 
Equal Protection gender-discrimination jurisprudence was fully developed.187 
As such, not only is it likely that courts would now be more open to hearing 
challenges to dress codes, but it is also likely that a number of cases would 
come out differently in light of the standard set forth in United States v. Virgin-
ia.188 
In Virginia, in 1996, the Supreme Court clarified that the government’s 
justification for a sex-based classification must be sincere and cannot be pure 
conjecture nor based on gendered stereotypes.189 Thus, a school may not justi-
fy its dress code in a way that relies on stereotypes about the different skills, 
capabilities, or inclinations of male and female students.190 
A number of judicially challenged dress code policies have required stu-
dents to dress in conformity with their gender, such as in the form of jewelry or 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (limiting the broad authority of school officials so as to prevent 
them from infringing on students’ constitutional rights). See generally supra notes 58–64 and accom-
panying text. 
 184 See Hayden, 743 F.3d at 582 (invalidating a school’s hair length requirement); Sturgis v. 
Copiah Cty. Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105065, at *3–7 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 15, 2011) (denying 
a motion to dismiss in order to further evaluate the plaintiffs’ arguments and the school’s proffered 
justification). This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s requirement that a governmental justifica-
tion for sex-based classifications must be genuine. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. 
 185 See infra notes 187–194 and accompanying text. 
 186 See infra notes 195–212 and accompanying text. 
 187 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (noting the timeline of Equal Protection jurispru-
dence in the context of sex discrimination and that of dress code litigation). 
 188 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. See generally Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (articulat-
ing the level of scrutiny that is required when analyzing sex-based classifications under the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
 189 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. 
 190 See id. (requiring government justifications to amount to more than mere conjecture and pro-
hibiting justifications that are based on “overbroad generalizations” about the differences between 
males and females). 
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attire to the prom.191 The requirement that students dress in a way that is nor-
mal for their gender contains an inherent presumption that there is a “normal” 
way for members of a gender to dress and relies on stereotypes about the pref-
erences of boys and girls.192 As such, the two high schools that justified their 
prohibition of boys wearing earrings on the grounds that the style’s rarity ad-
versely affected classroom focus and discipline would unlikely prevail to-
day.193 Similarly, a requirement that boys wear tuxedos to the prom rather than 
dresses, or that girls wear dresses and not tuxedos, also reflects a generaliza-
tion about the ways in which males and females prefer to dress.194 
B. Distraction as Justifications 
A school’s desire to prevent classroom distraction has been considered a 
legitimate interest that may justify a sex-based classification.195 Students seek-
ing to challenge their dress codes may argue, however, that these justifications 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See, e.g., Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (ana-
lyzing a school’s ejection of students from the prom because a female student was wearing a tuxedo 
and a male student was wearing a dress); Hines, 651 N.E.2d at 331 (analyzing prohibition against 
boys wearing earrings that was articulated through a rule requiring students’ jewelry to remain con-
sistent with community norms); Jones v. W.T. Henning Elem. Sch. Principal, 721 So. 2d 530, 532 
(La. Ct. App. 1998) (analyzing prohibition against boys wearing earrings). 
 192 See Greenblatt, supra note 66, at 295 (suggesting that a hair color requirement for highlights 
imposed on female students would reflect stereotypes about color preferences and that a prohibition 
on boys having highlights reflects a stereotype about hairstyles that are considered feminine). See 
generally Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (prohibiting justifications relying on stereotypes about the “pref-
erences” of males and females). 
 193 See Hines, 651 N.E.2d at 335 (noting that requiring students’ appearances to conform within 
the community is a legitimate means of instilling discipline); Jones, 721 So. 2d at 532 (finding the fact 
that it was uncommon for elementary school boys to wear earrings supported the school’s interest in 
limiting classroom distractions). This is further supported by the Supreme Court’s more recent reitera-
tion that Equal Protection jurisprudence must recognize that notions of what is considered unfair or 
unequal within the context of Equal Protection evolve over time. See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 
1690 (noting that the government’s proffered justification for a classification must be considered im-
portant within the context of today’s understanding of equality (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 
2603)). Moreover, it is also possible, although less likely, that the school that required students attend-
ing the prom to dress in conformity with their genders would be found to be in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause in the context of sex discrimination. See Harper, 655 F. Supp. at 1356 (finding no 
Equal Protection violation where a school required males to wear tuxedos and females to wear dresses 
to the prom). 
 194 See Harper, 655 F. Supp. at 1356 (finding it constitutional for a school to require its students 
to dress in conformity with their gender at the prom). Here, however, it is less likely that a court 
would find an Equal Protection violation because the policy was an evenly enforced, gender-neutral 
policy. See id.; see generally Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273–74 (requiring that gender-neutral policies have 
intentionally disparate impacts before subjecting them to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause). 
 195 See supra notes 162–166 and accompanying text (discussing distraction justifications); supra 
notes 167–171 and accompanying text (discussing the community norms and discipline justifications). 
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are no longer acceptable given their reliance on stereotypes.196 Recently, the 
notion that girls’ bodies are distracting has been criticized as an idea that per-
petuates stereotypes about boys’ inability to control their desires and girls’ re-
sponsibility for helping them do so by covering up.197 Although this justifica-
tion may have been legitimate in the past, the Supreme Court has noted the 
importance of taking into consideration contemporary societal points of 
view.198 Accordingly, lower courts evaluating schools’ justifications in Equal 
Protection analyses should be sure that the objective is consistent with current 
notions of fairness and equality.199 The Supreme Court’s Equal Protection ju-
risprudence has also cautioned against the perpetuation of gendered stereo-
types, especially when they are relied upon in the government’s proffered justi-
fication.200 Therefore, the assertion of the stereotype that girls’ clothing is too 
distracting, without more, may no longer be a sufficient justification.201 
This is not to say that it will never be sufficient because the prevention of 
distractions is still a legitimate school interest.202 If schools are able to demon-
strate that their desire to prevent distraction is not one-sided and that they are 
just as concerned with male students wearing distracting clothing, they will 
                                                                                                                           
 196 See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (noting that evolving societal points of views regard-
ing equality must be considered when analyzing an Equal Protection case); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 
(prohibiting reliance on stereotypes); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) 
(noting that although the government justification of providing for needy spouses was important, it did 
not justify the extra requirements for male widowers to get death benefits that female widows were 
not subject to). 
 197 See Chemaly, supra note 11 (criticizing the distraction justification for only focusing on what 
is distracting to heterosexual male students, rather than what might distract girls and LGTBQ students, 
and for telling girls that they are responsible for boys’ behavior); George, supra note 6 (describing 
female students’ protests against the distraction justification); Orenstein, supra note 11 (noting that 
schools often focus on girls with certain body types when concerning themselves with allegedly dis-
tracting clothing and implying that this sends a message that “young men cannot control themselves in 
the presence of a spaghetti strap”). 
 198 See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (noting that Equal Protection analyses should ac-
count for evolving notions of equality that may reveal that previously accepted practices are discrimi-
natory). 
 199 See id.; supra note 50 (discussing the Supreme Court’s suggestion that Equal Protection anal-
yses account for current societal viewpoints and lower courts’ application); see, e.g., Nat’l Coal. for 
Men v. Selective Serv. Sys., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28851, at *14, *25–26 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2019) 
(stating that it is “insufficient that the law served an important [governmental] interest in the past” and 
therefore invalidating a gender-based classification that had been justified in the past but was now 
understood to merely reflect gendered stereotypes (citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603)). 
 200 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (forbidding governmental reliance on stereotypes in defending 
against Equal Protection challenges). 
 201 See id. 
 202 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 513 (discussing distraction justification); Fenceroy v. Morehouse 
Par. Sch. Bd., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 949, at *11 (W.D. La. Jan. 6, 2006) (finding the prevention of 
distraction to be a legitimate school interest); Long, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 627 (recognizing schools’ need 
to prevent distraction). 
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likely defeat an Equal Protection challenge.203 Given courts’ indications that 
schools may be able to defend themselves by offering proof of a broad, com-
prehensive dress policy that applies with equal force to male and female stu-
dents, the likelihood of schools prevailing may increase with the number of 
ways in which they seek to limit classroom distractions in general.204 Moreo-
ver, if courts were to demand proof that the dress code is applied to both gen-
ders, this may also have the added benefit of deterring schools from singling 
out female students in the enforcement of the dress codes.205 
Courts may also employ a more searching analysis of this justification by 
seeking actual proof that male students are distracted by girls’ revealing cloth-
ing.206 The Supreme Court has cautioned against automatically accepting gov-
ernment justifications without actual proof and has emphasized that the justifi-
cations must be more than pure conjecture.207 Given the leeway that courts 
often give school administrators, influenced by schools’ pedagogical responsi-
bilities and expertise, this may be sufficient to transform a stereotype into a 
more grounded rationale.208 Absent proof that distractions are actually caused 
by only girls’ clothing, however, this justification amounts to nothing more 
than a stereotype about boys’ ability to control themselves and would therefore 
be deemed invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.209 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See Hayden, 743 F.3d at 581–82 (noting that the unconstitutional hair-length policy might 
have survived scrutiny if the school had offered proof that there was a similar, though not identical, 
requirement imposed on female students). 
 204 See id. (discussing the possible constitutionality of broad, comprehensive dress codes); see 
also Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 597 (noting the lack of a comparable burden on male students after 
having found a rule requiring female students to wear skirts to be unconstitutional). 
 205 See supra notes 11, 139 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which school dress 
codes and their enforcement target only female students). 
 206 See Olesen v. Bd. of Educ., 676 F. Supp. 820, 821, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (accepting a school’s 
justification that a ban on boys’ earrings prevents gang activity because the school offered proof of 
gang activity in the school and that it was symbolized through boys wearing earrings). See generally 
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (requiring that justifications be real and not hypothesized). Schools would 
likely be most successful in asserting a distraction justification if they were able to offer empirical 
proof that revealing clothing causes classroom distractions. See Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 709 
(W.D. Wis. 1969) (expressing desire for empirical data or testimony regarding actual occurrences in 
Equal Protection analysis of dress code); James & Zara, supra note 27, at 18 (noting that many federal 
courts seek statistical evidence when determining whether a classification is substantially related to 
the governmental objective). 
 207 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533, 535 (“[O]ur precedent instructs that ‘benign’ justifications prof-
fered in defense of categorical exclusions will not be accepted automatically . . . .”). 
 208 See supra notes 182–183 and accompanying text (discussing flexibility given to schools due to 
courts’ fear of interfering in schools’ daily operations and lack of expertise in matters of educational 
policy). 
 209 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (prohibiting justifications from relying on overbroad stereo-
types); supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing the recent but widespread characterization 
of the distraction justification as one that is based on stereotypes). Courts have taken this approach for 
Due Process analysis of hair-length requirements as well and have accordingly found them unconstitu-
tional when claims lacked sufficient evidence of actual distraction. See Sims v. Colfax Cmty. Sch. 
2019] Equal Protection and School Dress Codes 2579 
Even with proof that girls’ clothing can distract boys, however, schools 
should be cautious of the messages that this justification sends to students.210 
The one-sided nature that characterizes many dress codes gives female stu-
dents an array of subordinating messages—for example, that girls alone are 
responsible for preventing boys’ sexual desires, that girls’ bodies are sexual 
objects, or that boys’ education is more of a priority than that of girls.211 Given 
the fact that girls are often removed from class or extremely humiliated during 
class, the enforcement of dress codes may be just as distracting as the clothing 
itself, making some dress codes counter-productive to their purported justifica-
tion and less likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny.212 
CONCLUSION 
Although schools are given a significant amount of leeway when it comes 
to educating their students, they are not immune to allegations of constitutional 
                                                                                                                           
Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485, 489 (S.D. Iowa 1970) (finding a hair length rule unreasonable under the Due 
Process Clause due to lack of evidence that long hair served as a distraction); Breen, 296 F. Supp. at 
709–10 (finding in a First Amendment and Due Process analysis that the school had failed to prove 
that unusual haircuts were sufficiently distracting to justify the policy). The courts in these cases were 
skeptical of the proposition that students were distracted when it was unsupported by actual evidence. 
See Sims, 307 F. Supp. at 489 (referring to the school’s concern about distraction as “mere conclu-
sions based on subjective reasoning that long hair may be disruptive of the academic process”); Breen, 
296 F. Supp. at 709 (pointing to significant amounts of testimony by school administrators opining 
that unusual appearances distract other students but a lack of testimony of actual occurrences of such 
distraction or any empirical data supporting the notion). Similarly, the Peltier court noted a lack of 
evidence for the related justification of maintaining classroom order. 384 F. Supp. 3d at 596–97. Here, 
the school maintained that a requirement that girls wear skirts contributed to the high test scores of its 
students, but failed to offer any evidence to support this argument. Id. at 588. Moreover, the school 
argued that the rule helped maintain order in the classroom but, again, could not state how this rule 
helped fulfill this goal. Id. at 596–97. 
 210 See Harbach, supra note 58, at 1043–44 (discussing the numerous harmful messages that dress 
codes targeting female students send). 
 211 See id.; Chemaly, supra note 11 (detailing similar effects); Bates, supra note 11 (describing 
further messages being sent to female students); see also Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 587 (noting the 
plaintiffs’ argument that a uniform policy requiring females to wear skirts “sends a message that their 
comfort and freedom to engage in physical activity are less important than those of their male class-
mates”). See generally Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 (cautioning against the use of classifications to “cre-
ate or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women”). 
 212 See George, supra note 6 (telling the story of a girl who was forced to miss a portion of class 
because she was allegedly distracting other students with her leggings); Sullivan, supra note 11 (de-
scribing the humiliation a student faced when forced to wear a bright t-shirt that said “dress code vio-
lation” in school). The plaintiffs’ arguments in Peltier demonstrate the ways in which dress codes and 
their enforcement may sometimes serve to create, rather than prevent, distractions. See 384 F. Supp. 
3d at 587 (describing the disruptions caused by a requirement that female students wear skirts). Here, 
the female students contended that requiring them to wear skirts forced them to focus so much on the 
ways that they positioned their legs that they were distracted from class. Id. Moreover, when students 
violated the uniform rules, they were sometimes taken out of class and the school would either require 
the student to stay in the office or would call the student’s parents so that the student could go home 
for the day. Id. 
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violations. Public schools that treat their students differently on the basis of sex 
must have a genuine and exceedingly persuasive justification for doing so. 
Students who feel that their public schools’ dress codes unfairly target girls 
may be able to bring successful Equal Protection challenges against their 
schools. Students and adults throughout the country have taken a stance against 
schools, criticizing them for telling girls that their bodies serve as distractions 
to the boys in their classes. Many have characterized the message these dress 
codes send as one that says that girls’ bodies are sexual objects and that boys 
are incapable of controlling themselves. Given the Supreme Court’s mandate 
that Equal Protection jurisprudence account for evolving ideas of equality, the 
notion that girls who wear clothing that exposes their backs or shoulders dis-
tracts other students should no longer suffice. 
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